Senator Levin Opening Statement on FY 09 Defense Budget with Secretary of Defense Gates and CJCS Admiral Mullen

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February 6, 2008 -- "Good morning. The committee meets this morning to receive testimony from the Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen. Joining them is the Comptroller of the Department of Defense, Tina Jonas. Our witnesses are here to present the President’s fiscal year 2009 budget request for the Department of Defense, including both the so-called “base” budget and the additional $70 billion bridge fund requested for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan for the first part of fiscal year 2009.

I want to start by welcoming a new member of our Committee, Senator Wicker. We are glad to have you. I’ve got it on unassailable authority from a former colleague of yours, a member of the House whom I’ve known for over 70 years – my brother – that you will make a fine addition to our Committee.

First, some thanks. To our witnesses for their service and the very positive way they have worked with this Committee. And, I know they would agree, more importantly, to our men and women serving in our military. We are all truly grateful for their professionalism and dedication to our country, and for the sacrifices they and their families make.

Last year, this Committee, on a bipartisan basis, compiled a record of accomplishment we can all be very proud of:

First, we enacted an historic Wounded Warrior Act, which will improve the health care and benefits of recovering veterans and service members, and their families; which will vastly improve the coordination between DOD and the Veterans Administration; and end the confusing and conflicting system of disability determinations that have existed for too long between the DOD and the Veterans Administration.

We also enacted legislation that requires private security contractors operating in combat zones in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere to comply with orders and directives from military commanders and with DOD rules on the use of force.

Our legislation established a Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan to investigate federal agency contracting for reconstruction, logistics support, and security functions in those countries; established a new Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction to provide oversight and address contracting abuses; and extended the term of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction.

We enacted the far-reaching Acquisition Improvement and Accountability Act, which tightened the rules for DOD acquisition of major weapon systems, subsystems, and components to reduce the risk of contract overpricing, cost overruns, and failure to meet contract schedules and performance requirements; and we legislated a defense acquisition workforce development fund to ensure that DOD has enough skilled people to effectively manage its contracts. We also strengthened statutory protections for whistleblowers.

We established a chief management officer for the Department of Defense and each of the military departments to ensure continuous top-level attention to DOD management problems.

I am highlighting what we achieved last year in areas of oversight and accountability because we are here today to talk about a request for over a half a trillion dollars of taxpayer funds for DOD for the next fiscal year, excluding the cost of Iraq and Afghanistan, and possibly exceeding $700 billion when you include the full cost of those wars next year.

We are jointly responsible with the President for how those funds are spent. Last year’s actions to strengthen oversight and accountability were necessary, but they are not sufficient. The Department of Defense faces huge problems in its acquisition system. Over the last few years, we have seen an alarming lack of acquisition planning across the Department; the excessive use of time-and-materials contracts, undefinitized contracts, and other open-ended commitments of DOD funds. These problems have been particularly acute in Iraq and Afghanistan, but they are in no way limited to Iraq and Afghanistan.

The Government Accountability Office has reported that cost growth on seven of DOD’s largest acquisition programs ranged from 26 to 188 percent. In a period of just five years, GAO told us, the cost of the Department’s top five weapon systems programs had almost doubled, growing from $290 billion to $550 billion. [The Federal Procurement Data System reports that the federal government awards more than $100 billion in new sole-source contracts every year, but we know that this number is significantly understated, because it does not include billions of dollars of sole-source “task orders” and “delivery orders” awarded pursuant to existing contracts.]

The reforms we adopted last year, now signed into law, are an important step toward addressing problems in the Department’s acquisition programs, but it will take years of work by DOD – and close oversight by Congress – to make sure that we get the job done.

Many other challenges lie ahead. We have an Army and a Marine Corps which are way over stretched. The stress on our forces from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan continues to build. The media reports that there is a strong possibility that General Petraeus will recommend that force levels in Iraq remain at the pre-surge level of approximately 130,000 troops for some period of time, once the five surge brigades complete their redeployment this summer Meanwhile, our Army troops continue to face multiple tours of 15 month duration, with only 12 months or less at home between rotations, and Marines also see more time deployed than at home. These levels of deployment without adequate rest for the troops and repair and replacement of equipment simply cannot be sustained.

Over the past year, 30,000 additional troops have helped produce a welcome lessening of violence in Iraq, and a lower U.S. casualty rate. But the purpose of the surge, as stated by the President, has not been achieved in Iraq.

That purpose was to “provide enough space so that the Iraqi government can meet certain benchmarks or certain requirements for a unity government.” (2/5/07 remarks to the press.) But as the State Department’s report of November 21, 2007, stated: “Senior military commanders now portray the intransigence of Iraq’s Shiite-dominated government as the key threat facing the U.S. effort in Iraq, rather than al-Qaida terrorists, Sunni insurgents or Iranian-backed militias.”

The military progress on the ground was achieved with huge sacrifice and brilliance. We cannot accept that sacrifice being squandered by the Iraqi leadership’s continuing failure to achieve the key political benchmarks they set for themselves long ago, in particular:

* amending the constitution;
* passing a hydro-carbons law that fairly shares Iraqi oil wealth with all citizens;
* passing a provincial powers act; and
* conducting provincial elections.

The value of the new de-Baathification law, if it is a law -- despite the Iraqi constitution saying it isn’t because it failed to get the unanimous approval by the Presidency Council required for it to become law -- depends on how it is implemented.

For years, the Iraqi leaders have failed to seize the opportunity our brave troops gave them. It is long past time that the Iraqi leaders hear a clear simple message: we can’t save them from themselves – it’s in their hands, not ours, to create a nation by making the political compromises needed to end the conflict. That message is not the language of surrender. It’s common sense pragmatism, and the only realistic path to success.

A critical priority for this and future budgets must be the war in Afghanistan. Unlike with the war in Iraq, the connection between Afghanistan and the terrorist threat manifested on September 11th is clear and American support for the Afghanistan mission remains strong. Unfortunately, as a number of reports issued last week make clear, the Administration’s strategy in Afghanistan is not yet producing the results we all want. A report by the Afghanistan Study Group, chaired by retired General Jim Jones, and Ambassador Thomas Pickering, finds the Afghanistan mission is “faltering.” The report states “violence, insecurity, and opium production have risen dramatically as Afghan confidence in their government and its international partners falls.” Last year was the deadliest year since 2001 for U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan. A separate report from the Atlantic Council states, “Make no mistake, NATO is not winning in Afghanistan.”

The United States has recently announced its decision to commit an additional 3,200 U.S. Marines to Afghanistan, despite our already over-stressed U.S. forces. Unfortunately, some of our allies have not demonstrated a similar commitment to providing the troops and equipment which are needed for the Afghanistan mission.

Mr. Secretary, I am disappointed that this budget request does not include a request for the full amount of estimated expenditures in Iraq and Afghanistan for next year. That’s what our law requires. While the monetary cost is not the most important part of the debate over Iraq or Afghanistan, it does need to be part of that debate, and the citizens of our nation have a right to know what those costs are projected to be."

Source: Senator Carl Levin